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HOW DOES THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION
COMPARE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION?
Eileen R. Kaufman* and Leon Friedman**
Dean Eileen Katfnan:
The name of this segment of the program should be "Sex, Lies
and Videotapes." I will start out by talking about lies, and Leon
Friedman will add to that discussion and then shift to sex and
videotapes, and maybe shopping centers as well.

One of the most interesting, and certainly most litigated,
defamation questions in this state is when constitutional protection
should be afforded speech that arguably would be regarded as
opinion. In resolving that question, the New York Court of
Appeals has decided that the New York State Constitution affords
greater protection for speech than does the federal constitution.
Until 1990, courts had generally resolved this issue by looking
at the speech and deciding whether it fell on the fact or opinion
side of the line. If it fell on the opinion side of the line, it was
automatically constitutionally protected. Courts relied in large
part on dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' where the
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. B.A. Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975;
L.L.M. New York University, 1992. Dean Kaufman served as a Managing
Attorney at Westchester Legal Services, Inc., serves on the New York State
Bar Association President's Committee on Access to Justice, and is a Reporter
for the New York Pattern Jury Instructions.
** LL. B. 1960 Harvard, Admitted New York Bar, 1961; Assoc. Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handier, NY 1960-67; Gen. Counsel, Chelsea
House Publishers, 1968-70; Associate Director NYC Bar Association Special
Committee on Courtroom Conduct, 1970-73; Staff Counsel ACLU 1973-74;
Associate Professor Hofstra 1974-80; Professor since 1980.
1418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, a family hired an attorney to represent
them in civil litigation against the state after their son was killed by a police
officer. Id. at 326. A magazine covering the trial described the attorney as a
"Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" and the attorney subsequently filed a
libel action against the author and publisher. Id. at 326-27. The trial court
and reviewing court of appeal had held the plaintiff to the standard of a public
figure, thereby necessitating that he prove actual malice on the part of the
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Supreme Court stated "under the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction; not on the conscience of
judges and juries, but on the competition of other ideas." 2
To the surprise of many, the Supreme Court in Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co.,3 chided us for taking the Gertz language so
literally, and said that, "it was not intended to create a wholesale
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled
opinion." 4 So for example, if I were to say, "John Smith is a
murderer," we would all agree that is defamatory. If instead I
were to say, "In my opinion, John Smith is a murderer," that too
would be defamatory. Those three words, "in my opinion," are
treated as mere equivocation and do not serve to lessen the
defamatory import of my words. However, if I change it and
say, "John Smith supports the death penalty, John Smith is a
murderer," that would not be actionable.
That would be
understood by the reader or the listener as an expression of a
moral judgment rather than an assertion of a fact capable of being
proved true or false.
Therefore that statement would be
constitutionally protected.
publisher. Id. at 330. The Supreme Court reversed stating that the plaintiff
was not a public figure and that the lower courts had erroneously held him to
the higher standard imposed upon those so categorized. Id. at 352.
2 Id. at 339-40 (quoting from Thomas Jefferson's First Inaugural Speech
wherein he stated "[i]f there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this
Union or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments
of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left
free to combat it.").
3497 U.S. 1 (1990). In Milkovich, plaintiff had asserted a libel claim against
a local newspaper that printed an article in which plaintiff was accused of lying
at an investigatory hearing. Id. at 4. The lower courts had granted summary
judgment against plaintiff stating that the article was "constitutionally protected
opinion." Id. at 10. The Supreme Court reversed stating that "the dispositive
question in the present case then becomes whether a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the statements ... imply an assertion that petitioner
Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 21. The Court
stated that a balance must be struck between allowing "free and uninhibited
discussion of public issues" with "preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation."
Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
4
Id. at 18.
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In Milkovich, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that, rather than
focus on an artificial dichotomy between fact and opinion, the
approach focuses on the actual words that are challenged to see
whether they assert or imply a provably false fact.5 In other
words, only defamatory statements that are capable of being
proved false are subject to liability under state libel law.6
Therefore, under Milkovich, the essential task is to disentangle
assertions of fact from statements that do not assert or imply
provably false facts.
Using its newly announced standard and applying it to the facts
in Milkovich, the Court concluded that the speech at issue was not
constitutionally protected. The plaintiff in Milkovich was a high
school wrestling coach whose team had been involved in a fight
during a match. Milkovich testified at a hearing held by the Ohio
High School Athletic Association. Sanctions were imposed on
the team and the coach, although the sanctions were subsequently
set aside. 7 A newspaper ran an article that basically accused
Milkovich of lying at that hearing. Coach Milkovich brought a
defamation suit against the newspaper, arguing that the article
accused him of perjury and thereby ruined his reputation.8
Although the lower courts had held that the statements in the
article

constituted

constitutionally

protected

opinion, 9 the

Supreme Court reversed, finding that the article accused him of
perjury, which was a provably false fact, and therefore
actionable.o
If the Milkovich Court had stopped there, it would undoubtedly
have been a decision that sharply limited the constitutional
protection afforded speech. However, the Court explicitly
reaffirmed three earlier decisions of the Supreme Court that
together stand for the proposition that statements that cannot be

5 Id. at 19.
6id.
7Id.

8 Id. at
9

6-7.

Id. at 7.

10 Id.
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reasonably understood as asserting actual facts are protected:"
hyperbole, or
statements that could be characterized as rhetorical
12
imaginative expression, or mere name calling.
The first of these three cases is Greenbelt Cooperative
Publishing Association v. Bresler.13 In Greenbelt, a newspaper
characterized a real estate developer's negotiating position as
"blackmail." 14 The Court described that as merely a vigorous
developer's negotiating
epithet used by those who considered the
5
unreasonable.1
extremely
position to be
The second case expressly reaffirmed in Milkovich is National
Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin.' 6 In Letter Carriers, a

local newspaper called a union scab a traitor."' The Court said
that this was clearly loose figurative language expressing a lusty

" See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Cooperative
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
12Id.

"3398 U.S. 6. In Greenbelt, a local real estate developer sued for libel a
newspaper that had reported on local town ordinance meetings and had labeled
the developer's negotiating position as employing "blackmail." Id. at 7.
Plaintiff was awarded damages following a jury trial. Id. at 8. The Supreme
Court reversed finding fatal error in the jury charge given by the trial judge in
that his instructions allowed the jury to find liability "merely on the basis of a
combination of falsehood and general hostility." Id. at 10. The Supreme
Court stated that for the charge to have been constitutionally sufficient, it
should have stated that a public figure was entitled to a civil remedy "only if
he establishes that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge
of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true." Id.
14 Id. at7.
51Id. at 14.
16 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
In Letter Carriers, two postmen who had not joined
the postman's union enacted defamation actions against a local newspaper that
printed their names under a heading entitled "List of Scabs." Id. at 267.
Plaintiffs prevailed at trial and were awarded compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court reversed holding that "no such
factual representation can reasonably be inferred, and the publication is
protected under the federal labor laws" as a "lusty and imaginative expression
of the contempt felt by union members towards those who refuse to join." Id.
at 286-87.
17Id. at 267.
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and imaginative expression of18 the contempt felt by union
members and was not actionable.
The third, my favorite, although it is not really a defamation
case but rather an intentional infliction of emotional distress case,
is Hustler Magazine v. Falwel.1 9 I am sure you remember that

case. Hustler Magazine ran an ad parody based on a Campari
Liqueur ad campaign employing a sexual innuendo about the
"first time" someone tried Campari.o Hustler Magazine, taldng
off on that ad campaign, ran a cartoon that depicted Jerry Falwell
having sex in an outhouse with his mother with a caption
describing Jerry Falwell's "first time. " " The Court had little
trouble concluding that that was not actionable because no reader
would look at that depiction and understand it to be asserting an
actual fact about the plaintiff?22
There is no question that by reaffirming these three cases,
Greenbelt, Letter Carriers, and Hustler Magazine, the Court
blunted what would otherwise have been the sharp impact of the

Milkovich ruling. Before one applies the Milkovich rule that
requires the courts to parse the actual words and see whether they
assert or imply a provably false fact, the court has to make an
initial determination as to whether the challenged words are
merely rhetorical hyperbole or loose figurative language that
would not be understood as factual.Y

18
Id. at 285-86.

19 485 U.S. 46 (1988).

In Hustler, a popular religious leader instituted an

action against the publisher of a magazine that printed an advertisement parody
of a liquor ad in which the religious leader reminisces about his "first time"
(having sex) as having been with his mother in an outhouse. Id. at 48. The
Supreme Court held the speech was constitutionally protected as being part of
"the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and
concern." Id. at 50.
at 48.
20Id.
21

Id.

at 57.
1 See generally National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
2Id.

(1974); Greenbelt v. Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
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How does this play out under the New York State Constitution?
In Immuno A. G. v. Moor-Jankowski,24 Chief Judge Kaye, writing

for the majority, concluded that the New York State Constitution
provides more protection for speech than does the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.'

In reaching this

conclusion, she relied on a number of factors. One was that New
York, as the so called cultural center of the country, has a long
tradition of providing a hospitable climate for the free exchange
of ideas.26 New York has consistently provided the broadest
possible protection for freedom of the press. 27
This idea was the focus of a concurring opinion written by
Judge Wachtler some years earlier in Beach v. Shanley,28 where
he argued that the state constitution should be interpreted to

provide more protection for speech than the federal constitution.29
He based that conclusion on New York City's long tradition,

24

77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991). In Immuno,

a corporation commenced a libel action against the author and publisher of a
letter that appeared in a medical journal that was critical of the corporation's
plan to establish a hepatitis research center that would use chimpanzees in its
biomedical research. Id. at 240, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
25Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make
no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " Id.
26
Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
27
Id.
2862 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984). In Beach, a
reporter sought to quash a subpoena duces tecum that called for his appearance
at a Grand Jury to answer questions regarding the source of information that
was leaked from a previous Grand Jury investigation. Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d
at 306, 566 N.Y.S.2d. at 767. The reporter argued that forcing him to
disclose the source of the information was violative of the "Shield Laws"
enacted to protect the media from being held in contempt when protecting the
identify of a news source. Id. at 245, 567 N.E.2d at 306, 566 N.Y.S.2d. at
767. The Court of Appeals agreed and rejected the plaintiffs argument that
application of the Shield Laws in this instance would impermissibly "impair or
suspend" the Grand Jury's investigation. Id. at 254, 567 N.E.2d at 311, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 772. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was valid and
operated to protect the source of the reporter's information. Id.
29 Id. at 256, 567 N.E.2d at 312, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (Wachtler, J.,
concurring).
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dating back to colonial times, of protecting free speech. 30 He
pointed to the acquittal of John Peter Zenger as illustrative of the
state's long tradition of broadly protecting freedom of the press. 3'
In Immuno, Judge Kaye also relied on the differences in
constitutional text.32 The First Amendment33 reads very
differently from Article I, section 8 of the New York State
Constitution. 34 Section 8, adopted in 1821, provides, "Every
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of
the press."35 Judge Kaye noted that the framers of that provision
made a conscious choice not to use the language of the First
Amendment, 36 preferring rather "to set forth a basic democratic
ideal of liberty of the press in strong affirmative terms. "3
Analyzing the issue under New York State constitutional law,
the Court adopted a highly contextual approach, under which
courts have to go beyond the Milkovich rule of parsing the precise
words to determine whether they assert or imply a provably false
fact.38 Judge Kaye found that the Milkovich approach provided
insufficient protection to the central values protected by Article I,
section 8 of the New York State Constitution.39
The Court held that New York's constitutional free speech
guarantee shields statements when made in a context that would
lead a reasonable reader to consider the statements as an
expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact.4°

30

Id. at 255-56, 567 N.E.2d at 312, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (Wachtler, J.,

concurring).

31Id. (Wachtler, J., concurring).
32 Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 249, 567

N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.

33

U.S. CONST. amend I.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35
Id.
36 Immuno,
77 N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
3

Id.
31 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
39 Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 249-50, 567 N.E.2d at 1277-78, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
3

913-14.
4

Id.
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In Immuno, the challenged statement appeared in a letter to the
editor of a scientific journal. 4' The letter was written by an
animal rights activist, and was highly critical of plaintiff's plan to
establish a center in Africa for hepatitis research using
chimpanzees .42

Judge Kaye articulated a three-step process for evaluating
whether or not the statement was actionable.43 First, courts
should look at the words themselves to see if they are specific or
ambiguous." Next, courts should determine whether the words
are objectively capable of being proved true or false.45 Up until
this point, the analysis is little different from Milkovich.
However, the third step in the process requires courts to look at
the full context of the communication in which the statement
appeared,46 as well as the broader social context and surrounding
circumstances to see whether they signal to the audience that what47
is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.
Applying that approach to the statement at issue in Immuno,
Judge Kaye concluded that the statement was constitutionally
protected.48 She relied in large part on the fact that the statement
was contained in a letter to the editor published in a state long
considered the home of true expression of opinion.49
Since 1991 when the Court decided Immuno, there have been at
least five occasions where the New York Court of Appeals has
determined whether challenged speech is fact or opinion. 50 In
41Id.

at 239, 567 N.E.2d at 1271, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 907.

Id. at 240,
43 Id. at 250,
44 Id. at 243,
45 Id. at 255,
46 Id. at 250,
47 Id. at 243,
42

567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.

567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
567 N.E.2d at 1274, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
567 N.E.2d at 1274, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
48 Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
49 Id. at 252-53, 567 N.E.2d at 1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
' See Millus v. Newsday, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d 840, 675 N.E.2d 461, 652
N.Y.S.2d 726 (1996); Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 660 N.E.2d 1126,
637 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1995); 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfield, 80
N.Y.2d 130, 603 N.E.2d 930, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992); Armstrong v. Simon
& Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373, 649 N.E.2d 825, 625 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1995);
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three of those five occasions, the court has determined the speech
to be constitutionally protected. 1
The first case is Millus v. Newsday, Inc.,52 involving an
editorial that stated that the plaintiff, who was a candidate for
political office, admitted that he did not expect to win, and was
relieved by the prospect.53 The Court of Appeals held this was
nonactionable opinion due to its placement on the editorial page
and its overall tenor, which would alert the reader that the article
contained expressions of opinion.'M
The second case is Brian v. Richardson,5 involving an article

entitled "A High-tech Watergate.""6 The article was written by
Elliot Richardson, and it called for the appointment of a special
prosecutor to investigate the plaintiff.' That too was considered
to be nonactionable opinion because of its placement on the op-ed

Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 603
N.Y.S.2d 813 (1993).
11 See Millus v. Newsday, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d 840, 675 N.E.2d 461, 652
N.Y.S.2d 726 (1996); Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 660 N.E.2d 1126,
637 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1995); 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfield, 80
N.Y.2d 130, 603 N.E.2d 930, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992).
52 89 N.Y.2d 840, 675 N.E.2d 461, 652 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1996). In Millus,
plaintiff was a political candidate and had commenced an action against a
newspaper that had published, on the editorial page, a piece that stated that the
candidate admitted "he doesn't expect to win." Id. at 842, 675 N.E.2d at
462, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 727. The Court of Appeals found that a reader coming
across the editorial, "surrounded by other opinion pieces" was on notice that
what they were reading were expressions of opinion, not facts. Id.
53

Id.

54 Id. at

842, 675 N.E.2d at 462, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
N.Y.2d 46, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 637 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1995). In Brian, the
article accused the plaintiff of pirating software designed to assist the
Department of Justice with case tracking. Id. at 48, 660 N.E.2d at 1128, 637
N.Y.S.2d at 349. Applying the standard expressed in Immuno, the court
found that the article's position in the newspaper and "the broader context in
which the article was published" made it clear to a reader that its contents
represented an asserted opinion rather than fact. Id. at 54, 660 N.E.2d at
1131, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
56 Id. at 48, 660 N.E.2d at 1128, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
5 Id.
Z 87
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page, the humorous, speculative tone of the article, and the fact
that the article set out the basis of the author's view."
The third case is 600 West 115th Street v. Von Gutfeld 9 This

was a case involving a tenant who was very displeased by the fact
that there was a proposal to expand the restaurant on the ground
floor of the building where he lived. 6' The tenant spoke out at a
public hearing in aggressive terms, and said the restaurant would
denigrate the building, that the proposal was fraudulent and
smelled of bribery and corruption, and the lease was illegal. 6'
The statements were all held to be nonactionable, under
Milkovich, because they would be understood to be loose,
hyperbolic language, and, under Immuno, because of the
statement's content, tone and purpose.62
One of the two cases where the Court of Appeals found the
challenged statements to be actionable was Gross v. New York
Times Company.6' Gross was a case involving an assertion that
Id. at 54, 660 N.E.2d at 1131, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
59 80 N.Y.2d 130, 603 N.E.2d 930, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992). In Von
Gutfield, remarks were made by defendant at a condominium's Board of
Managers hearing that accused the plaintiff of entering into a sublease through
fraudulent means. Id. at 135, 603 N.E.2d at 932, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 827. The
Court of Appeals ruled the speech protected stating that after considering the
"content, tone, and purpose" of the speech, a reader would have to conclude
that the statement was "of opinion and advocacy and not a presentation
alleging objective fact." Id. at 145, 603 N.E.2d at 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
60 Id. at 133-34, 603 N.E.2d at 931, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
61 id.
62 Id. at 145, 603 N.E.2d at 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
6 82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813. In Gross, the
Chief Medical Examiner for the City of New York brought a defamation
action against the newspaper that published an article that stated that the
plaintiff had produced "misleading or inaccurate autopsy reports on people
who had died in custody of the police." Id. at 149, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 815. The Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of plaintiff's
claim to withstand a dismissal before an answer is served. Id. The Court of
Appeals stated that "[t]he dispositive inquiry, under either Federal or New
York law, is whether a reasonable [reader] could have concluded that [the
articles were] conveying facts about the plaintiff." Id. at 152, 623 N.E.2d at
1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817. The Court of Appeals found that the published
statements contained both assertions of fact and opinion and ruled that
58
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plaintiff had engaged in corrupt conduct in his capacity as chief

medical examiner.'

The Court concluded that the statement was

actionable because it was made in a copiously documented

newspaper series written after a purportedly thorough
investigation and appeared in the news section, rather than in the
editorial section.65
The second of these two cases is Armstong v. Simon & Schuster,
Inc.66 There, the court found that a statement that the plaintiff, an
attorney, deliberately presented a false affidavit for one client to
sign in order to exculpate another client was actionable and not
protected speech.'

In addition to the Court of Appeals cases described above, there
have been at least a dozen cases in the Appellate Division where
the courts, with very little difficulty, have found that the
challenged speech was opinion and therefore, constitutionally
protected under the Immuno standard.6

I want to conclude now because I am anxious to give Leon time
to continue this theme. I just want to say that, in my opinion,
while the New York standard seems to be far more generous in
plaintiff's claim withstood the motion to dismiss. Id. at 157, 623 N.E.2d at
1170, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
141 d. at 149, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
61 Id. at 156, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
In
66 85 N.Y.2d 373, 649 N.E.2d 825, 625 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1995).
Armstrong, the publishers of a book entitled "Den of Thieves" was sued by an
attorney who had represented several of the people discussed in the book. Id.
at 376, 649 N.E.2d at 826, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 478. Plaintiff claimed to have
been defamed by the author's statement that the attorney had submitted to his
client an affidavit containing information known by the attorney to be false.
Id. at 378, 649 N.E.2d at 828, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 480. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's finding that the statement contained "allegedly false
statements of verifiable fact" and held that the plaintiff must have the
opportunity to prove the alleged falsity at trial." Id. at 381, 649 N.E.2d 82930, 625 N.Y.S.2d 482-83.
67 Id. at 381, 649 N.E.2d at 830, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
1 See McGill v. Parker, 179 A.D.2d 98, 109, 582 N.Y.S.2d 91, 99 (1st
Dep't 1992); Albano v. Sylvester, 222 A.D.2d 472, 635 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d
Dep't 1995); Daniel Goldreyer v. Van De Wetering, 217 A.D.2d 434, 630
N.Y.S.2d 18 (lst Dep't 1995); Trustco Bank v. Capital Newspaper, 213
A.D.2d 940, 624 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dep't 1995).
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protecting speech than the federal standard, it may be that in the
vast majority of cases, the outcomes would be the same under
either state or federal analysis. The two standards use different
routes to get to more or less the same place. Both standards
ultimately focus on whether a reasonable reader would understand
the statement to be asserting a fact about the plaintiff. I think that
is ultimately the conclusion that the Second Circuit reached in a
recent case that Leon litigated6 9 and is about to discuss, a case
involving real intrigue: Russia, the KGB, and murder, so I turn
the podium over to Leon Friedman.
ProfessorLeon Friedman:
Professor Eileen Kaufman and I had to fight about who was to
talk about the defamation cases, so we made a deal that she would
give me a little piece the Levin case since I argued it in the
Second Circuit. Later I will talk about some of the zoning cases
and other New York State constitutional law cases.
The case that Professor Kaufman refers to, I will tell you,
responding to your last comment about whether one gets the same
result under the Federal Constitution and the New York
Constitution; we litigated this case in the Second Circuit, Levin v.
McPhee,'0 which was decided in July of 1997. As I look at my
watch, today is the last day for a certiorari petition to be filed, so
I do not know whether the case is over or not; although, I do not
think the Supreme Court will take this case.71
I represented the author and the book publisher, and Coudert
Brothers represented the The New Yorker author. We made a
very conscious decision, we are going to rely on the New York
Constitution.
We read Milkovich v. Lorain Journal7 2 as
See Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting
statements by defendant author concerning plaintiff's role in the death of a
famous Russian artist fell within "the category of rhetorical hyperbole or
imaginative expression" and were not actionable because they could not
"reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.").
70 119 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1997).
71 Petition for certiorari was not filed.
' Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
69
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This is not

going to work as a matter of the Federal Constitution, and I will

explain why in a moment.
The case concerned a book written by John McPhee,73 a very

well known nonfiction writer who has written for The New Yorker
for many years, and has written twenty or thirty books. His last
book concerned dissident Russian artists. You all know that from
1917 to the 1990's, the only kind of art that was allowed in the
Soviet Union was Soviet realism.74 You had to show pictures of
valiant workers and farmers doing their job with Stalin up there

as the beneficent, not dictator, but father, sort of helping
everybody. God forbid you would do anything that was abstract
or modem or that somehow deviated from Soviet realism. Well,
a number of Soviet artists felt impelled to engage in this dissident
75
art.

There was an American who went to the Soviet Union, and
collected this art and spent millions and millions of dollars to

collect this art,76 ten thousand pieces which are now in a museum

73 Id. at 191 (referring to JOHN McPHEE, THE RANSOM OF RUSSIAN ART
[hereinafter RANSOM] (1994)). RANSOM portrays the saga of an American,
Norton Dodge who traveled throughout the Soviet Union collecting the works
of certain Russian artists who had been considered "nonconforming" and
therefore "dissident" by the government. Id. at 191-92 n.l. See RANSOM,
supra at 73.
74 Levin, 119 F.3d at 191-92 n. 1. Artists whose works conformed to this
style were considered by the government to be " [o] fficial artists." Id. at 192
n.1.
75 Id. These "dissident" or "unofficial" artists were often "harassed,"
particularly those that did not have another occupation, and sometimes found
themselves viewed as "unemployed parasites." Id. Some would be sent to
"labor camps or mental hospitals." Id. While "official artists" had access to
all the supplies necessary to engage in their craft, unofficial artists "had to
wangle things one way or the other" using such supplies as "oilcloth,"
"wallboard," or "automobile Paint." See RANSOM, supra note 73, at 23.
76 Levin, 119 F.3d at 191-92. The American referred to in the opinion is
Norton Dodge who spent 30 years and $3,000,000 to amass this collection.
Id.
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in Rutgers." There was a leading Russian dissident artist whose
name was Evgeny Rukhin. 78 He was a target for the KGB, there
were all sorts of petty harassments, and one day his studio just
burned down; he was killed and his girlfriend was killed.79

It was like terror had struck in the hearts of all the Russian
dissident artists, ° because this escalated the fight; this was
murder and arson. There was a lot of speculation as to who did
this terrible crime. McPhee wrote, I did not tell him to do this -but he said the whole thing is "shrouded in mystery," and some
lawyer friend of mine said that the shrouded in mystery defense
wins again because, since everything is shrouded in mystery, no
one really knows what happened.
In any event, there was speculation and there were five different
theories as to why this artist's studio was burned down.8
Someone said his wife did it because he had a lot of girlfriends;

and someone else said it was some other artists who did it
because they were jealous of his success; and there was another

version that said it was an accident, he just had all these oily rags
around there; and then another person speculated and said some
people think "Ilya Levin did it for the KGB, it is a possibility.""

' See Jo Ann Lewis, Trove from the Underground: The Maryland
MillionaireWho Saved the Art of a Soviet Era, WASH. POST, May 14, 1995, at
G1.
78 Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d at 192 n.2 (noting that "by the mid-seventies,
Ruhkin was the Russian artist most widely known in the United States."). See
RANSOM,

supra note 73, at 50. Ruhkin is described as "an unofficial artist of

exceptional talent, who also-in his incautious, magnetic, unofficial way-was
an organizer of other artists." See RANSOM, supra note 73, at 39.
79 Levin, 119 F.3d at 192.
80 Id. at 193. Sarah Burke, an American alleged to have been romantically
involved with Ruhkin, stated in an interview that after the fire "[a]rtists really
ran scared." Id. at 192-93. See RANSOM, supra note 73, at 152.
81Levin, 119 F.3d at 192-94.
82 Id. at 192-93. Sarah Burke, in her interview, offered three theories
concerning the fire. Id. She explained that "some people [thought] that Ilya
Levin did it for [the K.G.B.]," some people thought that Ruhkin's wife did it
and maybe it was just an accident because the studio was "full of vodka,
cigarettes, and the chemically soaked rags" that "were always found on the
stairs." Id. See RANSOM, supra note 73, at 152.
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Now I must say, if they had given me the book to read
beforehand, I would have said what are the chances of someone
named Ilya Levin, who was in the Soviet Union in 1973, being in

the United States in a position to bring a libel action within one
year, one year because New York has a very short statute of
limitations, and I must say I would have said minimal risk, let it
go. Thank God it was the lawyer for The New Yorker who did
that, because the article first appeared in The New Yorker3 and he
made the judgment to let it go, and he did not give me the book

to vet.
Well, sure enough, you know the result, lya Levin is in the
United States, working in Washington, and he sees this reference
to himself "some people think lya Levin did it, it is a
possibility." He brought a libel suit against The New Yorker, the
book publisher for Farrar, Straus and John MePhee . '
We made the judgment, we never answered the complaint to
make a motion to dismiss right on the face of the complaint.o
We made the judgment that our best shot was New York, under
the New York Constitution."' In particular, the three cases that
119 F.3d at 194. McPhee also wrote an article entitled Ransom of
Russian Art which appeared in the October 17, 1994, issue of The New Yorker
shortly before the book was published. Id. The article included excerpts from
the book which Levin contended, although specifically not mentioning him by
name, was capable of a defamatory meaning. Id.
I Id. at 194. See Levin v. McPhee, 917 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
5Levin, 119 F.3d at 194. Defendants moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
to dismiss the complaint on several grounds. Id. Defendants contended that
the statements concerning Levin "were not susceptible to defamatory meaning,
and... were statements of opinion, rather than statements of fact." Id.
I Levin v. McPhee, 917 F. Supp. 230, 235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The
district court determined that New York law applied noting that " Itihe standard
of tort liability ...is determined according to the law of the state with the
greatest interest in regulating the injurious conduct at issue." Id. at 235 (citing
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481-82, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 749-50 (1963)).
87 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section grants more expansive rights than
those granted by the Federal Constitution, stating: "Every citizen may freely
speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or the press." Id.
3Levin,
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we talked about, Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, s Gross v.
New York Times Company, 89 and even though it went the other
way, there is a marvelous sentence in Gross, or paragraph that
said, "You can even accuse a person of criminality as long as all
the facts that support your position are laid out in the book or in
the statement." 90 Well, I liked that because all the facts relating
to the speculation were laid out in the book. So Immuno, Gross
and Brian v. Richardson,9 which came down in the middle of the
whole case, were extremely helpful to us.
The case was
dismissed by the district court, 92 and the Second Circuit affirmed
77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991).
89 Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 603
N.Y.S.2d 813 (1993). In Gross, the New York Court of Appeals considered a
series of articles published by the New York Times concerning the alleged
misconduct of the former Chief Medical Examiner of the City of New York.
Id. at 149, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815. The articles accused
Doctor Gross of mishandling "several high profile cases" and using "his
authority to protect police officers and other city officials " after certain
individuals died in police custody. Id. The court held that "the plaintiff's
complaint, which encompass[ed] actionable assertions of fact as well as
nonactionable opinions and conclusions, [was] sufficient to withstand a motion
to dismiss...." Id.
'0 Id. at 155, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819. The New York
Court of Appeals stated that:
[A]ccusations of criminality could be regarded as mere
hypothesis and therefore not actionable if the facts on which
they are based are fully and accurately set forth and it is clear
to the reasonable reader or listener that the accusation is
merely a personal surmise built upon those facts.
Id.
9' 87 N.Y.2d 46, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 637 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1995). The
controversy in Richardson centered around an article published by the New
York Times which appeared on the op-ed page. Id. at 48, 660 N.E.2d at 1127,
637 N.Y.S.2d at 349. The article, entitled "A High-Tech Watergate," made
certain accusations directed at the plaintiff and the United States Department of
Justice. Id. at 48, 660 N.E.2d at 1128, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 349. In dismissing
the complaint, the New York Court of Appeals held that "it was sufficiently
apparent to the reasonable reader" that the contents of the article "represented
the opinion of the author and that [the] specific charges ... were allegations
and not demonstrable fact." Id. at 54, 660 N.E.2d at 1131, 637 N.Y.S.2d at
352.
1 Levin v. McPhee, 917 F. Supp. 230, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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all on New York opinion law. 93 By the way, under federal law it
might apply as well. 4
There is a whole doctrine that the Second Circuit recognized in
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.," which we also

thought might work here. But believe me, the theory was always
the New York Constitution, that is what counts, and that is what
the Second Circuit said. 6
There is a difference in this particular area: New York opinion
law has a much broader scope than Federal Constitutional opinion
law, 97 what constitutes opinion as defined by the Supreme Court
in Milkovich.9 8 So there is a difference. I think that if you look
at the whole string of cases, you will see the difference. I was
also involved with Mike Armstrong, who was my classmate, but I
wrote a brief on the other side in his caseP9 That one really had
93 119 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1997).
4 Id. at

196. The Second Circuit noted that the "United States Constitution
offers no wholesale protection for so-called 'expressions of opinion' if those
expressions imply assertions of objective fact." Id. (citing Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)). However when such statements fall
within "the category of 'rhetorical hyperbole' or 'imaginative expression,'
those statements are not actionable because they 'cannot be reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts.' " Id. (citing Milkovidh, 497 U.S. at 20).
91 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977). In Edwards, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed a libel judgment against the New
York Times. Id. at 115. The New York Times had published statements of the
Audubon Society which had attacked scientists who had continued to support
the use of DDT, a popular insecticide. Id. The court spoke of the "press's
right of neutral reportage." Id. at 120. The court explained that the press
need not report details with "literal accuracy," to be protected from
defamation suits. Id. The journalist will be immune when he "believes,
reasonably and in good faith, that his report accurately conveys the charges
made." Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290-92 (1971)).
1 Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d at 196-97.
91 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 3. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... " Id.
98 Id. at 196-97. The Court in Milkovich stated that the First Amendment
does not necessitate an inquiry into whether statements are opinion or fact
because to do so would create "an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and
fact." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
19 Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373, 649 N.E.2d 825, 625
N.Y.S.2d 477 (1995).
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to do with an inference, I do not know that that was opinion law.
However, New York law continues to, and there are a whole
bunch of lower court cases in the last year, support the idea that
you get more protection for freedom of speech and in the press,
especially in the area of libel.' ' I mean there is absolutely no
doubt. The practitioners in the field of libel law, we love New
York, I mean there is no doubt about it when something like that
happens.
Let me turn now to the other areas in which New York's First
Amendment law, it is actually Article I, Section 8 of the New
York Constitution, is different or more expansive or looks at a
problem in a different way. The idea that the New York
Constitution gives broader protection first appeared in O'Neill v.
Oakgrove Construction, Inc.,'01 a case dealing with the issue of
whether a reporter has a privilege under the New York State
Constitution not to reveal his sources, and this was before the
most recent version of the shield law was passed.'
The Federal Constitution does not allow a reporter not to
disclose his sources, certainly in the criminal context before a
federal grand jury; 3 and only under very limited circumstances

10o Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 223 A.D.2d, 270, 645
N.Y.S.2d 951 (4th Dep't 1996).
10171 N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988).
'o2 Id. at 524, 523 N.E.2d at 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 1. In O'Neill, the law in
effect at the time required "full disclosure of all evidence material and
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action," wherever "sufficient
independent evidence is not obtainable." Id. at 526, 523 N.E.2d at 279, 528
N.Y.S.2d at 3 (citing Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 116-17,
316 N.E.2d 301, 302, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1974)). See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101
McKinney (1996). This section provides: "There shall be full disclosure of all
matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,
regardless of the burden of proof . . . ." Id. The New York Court of
Appeals stated that the "protection afforded by the guarantees of free press and
speech in the New York Constitution is often broader than the minimum
required by the First Amendment." O'Neill, 71 N.Y.2d at 529 n.3, 523
N.E.2d at 280 n.3, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 4 n.3.
103 Id. at 529 n.2, 523 N.E.2d at 280 n.2, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 4 n.2 (citing
Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665, 680-81 (1972)).
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in a civil case." ° However, in O'Neill, the Court of Appeals
said, "The protection afforded by the guarantees of free press and
speech in the New York Constitution is often broader than the
minimum required by the First Amendment."05 I mean it is nice
to rely on the different terminology contained in the New York
Constitution than in the First Amendment. That does not mean it

is always more expansive, and indeed, there are a number of
cases in which the New York Court of Appeals has said they are
going to come to the same conclusion as the Federal Constitution.
Just to remind you, the Supreme Court held some years ago that

there is no right to free expression on private property. A private
property owner may simply, this is the SHAD Alliance v. Smith
Haven Mall10 6 out here on Long Island, not want protesters
there."17 The New York Court of Appeals in SHAD Alliance v.

Smith Haven Mall held that New York's guarantee of free speech
did not allow people to go on private property to engage in
protest.

8

The California Supreme Court went the other way,'09 as did the
New Jersey Supreme Court, at least in the context of a private
university.1 This was the Princeton University case, where the
court said you must let people on the campus to distribute
"oSee United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir. 1982) (seeking
discovery
in an antitrust action).
'05 Id. at 529 n.3, 523 N.E.2d at 281 n.3, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 529 n.3.
666 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985).
107 Id. at 498, 488 N.E.2d at 1212, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The protestors in
SHAD Alliance went onto mall property to hand out leaflets which encouraged
people to oppose nuclear power and, in particular, the controversial Shoreham
Nuclear Power Plant. Id. at 499, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
The court held that there was no constitutional right to freedom of expression
on03private property. Id at 508, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
" Id. at 508, 488 N.E.2d at 1213, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
109 Robbins v. Prune Yard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aftd,
447 U.S. 74, 80 (1980). In Prune Yard, the California Supreme Court
explained that the California State Constitution protected protestors at a private
shopping center if they protested in a "reasonable" manner. Id. at 347.
110 State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 633 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed sub
nom Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
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Everyone had great hope that the New York Court of
leaflets.'
Appeals would expand it, but they did not. In SHAD Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall, the court went the other way."' Now in other
cases they have expanded it.
There is a case called Bellanca v. New York State Liquor
Authority,"' involving topless dancing in a bar. When that case
went to the United States Supreme Court, the Court decided that
even though topless dancing may be expressive conduct, you have
the Twenty-first Amendment,"' which allows the states to ban all
liquor even though the Twenty-first Amendment overruled the
Eighteenth Amendment. 15
There is a section of the amendment that says that any state
may, for its own reason, ban the sale of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages. The reasoning of the Supreme Court was that if you
could ban liquor altogether in a bar, you can do something lesser,
which is to ban topless dancing when liquor is sold." 6 In other
words, the greater ability to prohibit the sale of liquor altogether
carries with it the lesser power to attach conditions to the sale of
alcohol. "1

Id.
112

107.

Shad Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 508, 488 N.E.2d at 1219, 498 N.Y.S.2d at

452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam).
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. The Twenty-first Amendment provides in
pertinent part: " The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id.
115 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. The Twenty-first Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed." Id.
116 New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 717 (1981)
(citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33 (1975)).
117 Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 717. The Supreme Court noted that the States had
"broad powers" to regulate liquor sales by virtue of the Twenty-first
Amendment which would outweigh any "interest in nude dancing" which
might be conferred by the First Amendment. Id. The Bellanca Court noted
that "[t]he State's power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages entirely
includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless
dancing occurs." Id.
13

114
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The New York Constitution does not have a Twenty-first
Amendment, I mean there is nothing about banning alcohol. So
the escape hatch that the Supreme Court had in the topless
dancing case simply does not apply here, which is what the New
York Court of Appeals held in the Bellanca case." 8 There have

been a number of cases dealing with zoning, also dealing with the
whole situation of First Amendment uses, and whether zoning
ordinances can be used to block expressive conduct for example,
adult book stores.
We are about to get a big case in the New York Court of
Appeals,119 and that is Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of
New York. no Stringfellow's is one of these adult places in New
York.121 New York City passed an amended zoning resolution on
October 25, 1995.12 We all know Times Square was open for a

long period of time, there really was no specific zoning law;
there certainly were other laws that dealt with adult
establishments, but there was no zoning law. The Guiliani
Administration pushed through a provision, I think in October of
1995, an amended zoning resolution.'

"

Id. at 718. The Supreme Court explained that:
Whatever artistic or communicative value may attach to
topless dancing is overcome by the State's exercise of its
broad powers arising under the Twenty-first Amendment.
Although some may quarrel with the wisdom of such
legislation and may consider topless dancing a harmless
diversion, the Twenty-first Amendment makes that a policy
judgment for the state legislature, not the courts.

Id.
119 See Stringfellow's, Nos. 17, 18, 19, 1998 WL 77749 (NY Ct. of Appeals
Feb. 24, 1998) (holding that a city could enact zoning ordinances that restrict
adult entertainment establishments in potential residential districts).
'2 171 Misc. 2d 376, 653 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1996).

Id. at 378, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 803.

121

at 380-81, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 804-05. The Amended Zoning Resolution
placed "restrictions on the location, size and signage of specified types of adult
establishments." Id. at 381, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (explaining Amended
Zoning Resolution §§ 32-01 (a) and 42-01 (a)).
11 Id. The Amended Zoning Resolution was approved by the New York
City Council on October 25, 1995. Id.
122d.
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First, they allowed adult establishments defined in the statute
only in certain districts of New York City.2 4 Second, in the
districts where such establishments are permitted, a new adult use
must be located at least five hundred feet away from any other
adult use.'25
This is something that a lot of cities around the country did,
which is to spread them out. Boston had the opposite theory,
they put them all together; said everyone has to be here, and
there was the combat zone or something down in downtown
Boston, every adult establishment must be here, we do not want it
to contaminate anywhere else. Well, other cities sort of spread
them out. The Supreme Court in the case of Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 126 a zoning ordinance, said that was okay. 12
In later Supreme Court cases, particularly a case called Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., "8 the Supreme Court said that a

zoning ordinance, focusing on adult book stores, was
superfluous.1 29 If the store was conducting activities deemed to
be obscene, you just bring a criminal action on obscenity and
close them down.
New York did have a case called Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc.,"30 which did go to the United States Supreme Court, in

which an adult bookstore was closed down as a public

Id. at 381, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (citing Amended Zoning Resolution
§§ 32-01 (b) and 42-01 (b)).
12 Id. at 382, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (citing Amended Zoning Resolution
§§ 32-01 (c) and 42-01 (c)).
126427 U.S. 50 (1976).
127 Id. at 62. The Supreme Court noted that a municipality may confine adult
establishments "to certain specified commercial zones" or require them to be
"dispersed throughout the city." Id.
124

12 475 U.S. 41 (1986).

Id. at 54. The Renton Court found that a zoning ordinance that did not
allow any adult movie theater to operate within 1,000 feet of a residential zone
was a "valid governmental response to [an] 'admittedly serious problem[]."'
Id.
130 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd, 478
U.S. 697 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492,
510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986).
129
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After the case was remanded by the United States
nuisance.'
Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals had established

a much more protective ruling. 2
reversed.'

The Supreme Court

On remand, the Court of Appeals said that an

injunction against a public nuisance will not result because that is
a prior restraint, and the court knocked that part of it out."' 4
But with zoning, the Supreme Court had held in Renton that as
long as the zoning ordinance was after the secondary effects of
the contents of the bookstore; in other words, you are not saying
we hate adult magazines, newspapers, movies and so on, you can
not do that.'35 If you focus on the content of what is sold, it is
protected by the First Amendment.13 6 But if you focus on the
"secondary effects," restrictions are permissible. What does that
mean?
Bad people hang around these places, it is dangerous, and
unhealthy for children or anyone else.' If the zoning ordinance
131 People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 119 Misc.2d 505, 505-06,
465 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (1983).
13 People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d. 553, 503 N.E.2d
492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986).
'3 Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707. The Supreme Court explained that:
Bookselling in an establishment used for prostitution does not
confer First Amendment coverage to defeat a valid statute
aimed at penalizing and terminating illegal uses of premises.
The legislature properly sought to protect the environment of
the community by directing the sanction at premises
knowingly used for lawless activities.
Id.
"4Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d. 553, 558-59, 503 N.E.2d 492, 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d
844, 847 (explaining that the States "may not impose a prior restraint on
freedom of expression to silence an unpopular view.").
135 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986).
The
Court stated that the zoning ordinance did not try to restrict the "message
purveyed by adult theaters." Id. at 48.
136 Id. at 47-48 (noting "regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining
speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First
Amendment.").
137 d. at 51. The Court noted that the City of Renton was "entitled to rely
on the experiences of Seattle and other cities.., in enacting its adult theater
zoning ordinance." Id. The Court then explained that adult theatres may have
"adverse effects... on neighborhood children and community improvement
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focuses on the secondary effects, then it is okay.' 38 It is a little
hard because you are dealing in some sort of metaphysics here.
It is the content that creates the secondary effects; but as long as
you focus on secondary effects, that is okay.'
The New York
Court of Appeals has not adopted the Renton test up until now.
In a case concerning the Town of Islip, Town of Islip v.
Caviglia,141 the New York State Court of Appeals said we are
adopting the Renton test.14' There was a zoning ordinance in Islip
where all the town's adult bookstores and adult establishments
had to be in the industrial zone.' 42 The New York Court of
43
Appeals upheld it. 1

The Stringfellow's'44 case is a little more conjectural because in

Stringfellow's, the Appellate Division affirmed, 145 and it is now
up to the Court of Appeals. 146

I understand it is going to be

efforts." Id. (quoting Northend Cinema, Inc., v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1156
(Wash. 1978) (en banc)).
138 Id. at 54-55.
139
Id.
140 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989).
141 Id. at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 142. The Renton test
allows a municipality to use a zoning ordinance to regulate adult establishments
providing:
[The "predominant purpose" of the ordinance is not to
control the content of the material purveyed but to control the
"secondary effects" of such uses on the community, the
ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental
interest, it is narrowly tailored to affect only the category of
uses that produce the unwanted effects and it allows for
reasonable alternative avenues of expression.
Renton v. Platime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).
142 Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 549, 540 N.E.2d at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
The Cavigliacourt noted that even though the zoning ordinance concerns only
"adult uses," there was no attempt by the town "to regulate speech, ... its
effect on expression is only incidental." Id. at 557, 540 N.E.2d at 222, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 146.
143Id. at 562, 540 N.E.2d at 224, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
144 171 Misc. 2d 376, 653 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1996).
145 663 N.Y.S.2d 812, 812 (1st Dep't 1997).
146 See Stringfellow's, Nos. 17, 18, 19, (NY Ct. of Appeals February 24,
1998) (holding that a city could enact zoning ordinances that restrict adult
entertainment establishments in potential residential districts).
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argued in January.1 47 The opponents of the new resolution say
that instead of one hundred seventy-one adult establishments in
New York City, if this goes through it will be reduced to about
twenty-eight. 48 So this really will have quite an effect on this
whole area.
The lower court decision upheld the amended zoning ordinance
on three grounds. First, the court found that the law did focus on
secondary effects, and was not based on content. 4 9 Second, they
said that there was a finding of adverse secondary effects, the
plaintiffs in that case argued there is no finding, New York is not
Islip or anywhere else.150 You sort of expect these things when
you go to Times Square and, you know, what are the bad
secondary effects? But the City Council had done a very good
job of making a record in the Zoning Board of the bad secondary
effects created by this adult zone, and the court found that the
5
secondary effects were supported by the record. '
The third requirement is whether there are alternative methods
of communication.1 5 2 That is to say assuming the zoning law
goes into effect, are there other places theoretically where you
The lower court
could set up the shops, or similar shops.
147 id.

Id. at *10 (noting that the amended zoning resolution's enforcement "will
lead to the forced relocation of some 84% of the City's 177 adult
141

businesses.").

149Stringfellow's, 171 Misc. 2d at 386, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 808-09 (Sup. Ct.

New York County 1996).
150 Id. at 388, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (explaining that the City Council "was
justified in finding that the present configuration of adult use establishments
causes adverse secondary effects... which demonstrates that the Amended
Zoning resolution was based on a compelling state interest related to
combating such negative effects, rather than restricting speech.").
151
Id.
12 Id.

at 389, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10 (stating that "[t]he last requirement
that the Amended Zoning Resolution must meet to pass constitutional muster is
whether it allows for 'reasonable alternative avenues of communication.'").
153 Id. at 389, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (explaining that "[t]he New York
standard ...is... whether or not "there remains ample space available for

adult uses.") (citing Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 555, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542

N.Y.S.2d at 145).
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found that there was. 54 The amended zoning ordinance met the
three parts of the Renton test as adopted by New York in
Caviglia, and the court upheld the law.' 55 The case will be
argued in January, and I am sure the Court of Appeals will have
another chance to look at this zoning requirement. 156
Let me tell you about one last case. The New York Court of
Appeals in a case this year called Rogers v. New York City
TransportationAuthority, 51 7 dealing with handing out literature in
the subways. 5 8 In that case, the Transit Authority had very
limited rules on First Amendment activities in the subways.' 5 9
You do not want people selling newspapers on the platforms."W
There was somebody who was trying to sell a newsletter, not on
the platform, but in some other area. 161
There was a whole argument about whether the New York City
subway system is a public forum, which is the magic phrase
154 Id. at 396, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 814 (stating that "[e]ven if the City's estimate
overstates the number of potentially viable relocation cites, there still remains
ample space for more than the existing number of adult establishments.").
5 Id. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48 (1986).
156 See Stringfellow's, Nos. 17, 18, 19, 1998 WL 77749 (NY Ct. of Appeals
Feb. 24, 1998). The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the "City's
effort to address the negative secondary effects" of adult establishments "is not
constitutionally objectionable under any of the standards set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in ... Renton." Id. at *12. See Renton, 475
U.S. at 47-48.
157 89 N.Y.2d 692, 680 N.E.2d 142, 657 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1997).
158 Id. at 696, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 873. James Rogers
received a fine of $50 for selling a political organization's newspaper on a
subway platform. Id. at 696, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
Rogers sought review of the New York City Transit Authority's determination
that he violated a regulation against selling such newspapers in the subway
station. Id.
5 Id. The Transit Authority's rule prohibits any person from engaging "in
any commercial activity upon any facility or conveyance unless "duly
authorized by the authority." N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 21,
§ 1050.6 (b) (1995). The statute defines "commercial activity" as "the
advertising, display, sale, lease, or distribution of food, goods, services or

entertainment (including the free distribution of promotional materials) . ..

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6 (b) (1) (1995).
160 Id. at 702-05, 680 N.E.2d at 148-49, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 877-78.
161Id. at 696, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
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under the First Amendment. 16 If it is a public forum, then other
people must be given the same opportunity to sell the material.'
Indeed, the New York Transit Authority had allowed some
limited First Amendment activity within the subway, and this
person said I should have the same opportunity. The New York
Court of Appeals decided Rogers and held that they had adopted

the federal rule.164 The Supreme Court in a case called
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, '6 said
that an airport 6 and therefore a subway station are not public
forums. The New York Court of Appeals found that the rule was
proper. 67
Therefore, I think the Stringfellow's case, the zoning case, is a

very important case and we will just have to see whether the New
York Court of Appeals will apply the same kind of zoning rules
as the federal system. 16 As you can see, in all these other areas,

Id. at 698-701, 680 N.E.2d at 145-48, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874. The Rogers
court noted:
Under the public forum doctrine, regulation of speech on
government property that traditionally or by designation has
been opened up for public expression and debate should be
given the sharpest scrutiny. Regulations of time, place and
manner of expression may be permitted only when they are
content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest and allow for alternative modes and
methods of communication.
Id. at 698, 680 N.E.2d at 145-46, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874-75 (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
63
Id. at 698, 680 N.E.2d at 145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
" [a] subway
'6 Id. at 705, 680 N.E.2d at 150, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 879 (noting
station is simply not a public forum... (citation omitted) and the rule should
not be used as a boomerang to transform the Transit Authority's reasonably
accommodating allowance into an 'Open Sesame' for a stampede of likely
competitors.").
165 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
166 Id. at 680 (noting that only in recent years have airports become a
"forum" used by groups to distribute materials or solicit money).
" Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 705, 680 N.E.2d at 150, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
16' See Stringfellow's, Nos. 17, 18, 19, 1998 WL 77749 (NY Ct. of Appeals
Feb. 24, 1998).
162
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we love New York where the First Amendment is concerned.
Thank you very much.

